Resistances and the emergence of a post-neo-liberal just city: Social and seismic movements in the neo-liberal Chile after disasters

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1. THE RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS CAN BE VIEWED AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR WHOM?

The reconstruction process can be viewed as an opportunity for development. This leads to the following question: an opportunity for what and for whom? To answer this question, the conditions of neoliberal Chile in the face of the 2010 earthquake and tsunami must be analysed, by adopting a ‘vulnerability approach, given the central role it plays and especially its economic and political aspects in the process of a disaster’ (Oliver-Smith, 2002). In Chile, neoliberalism has been implemented and taken root; its social and
economic outcome further amplified the disaster’s impact, in the sense of synergies of vulnerabilities.

The 2010 earthquake thus operated as an indicator of Chilean society. It highlighted the spatial inequalities and injustices which have unfolded over the last forty years. It also revealed the crucial role of social players, especially the pobladores movement, as they organise and resist to achieve better living conditions. The earthquake sped up social processes in a country which seemed to have been numbed by a seventeen-year dictatorship followed by twenty years of never-ending transition to democracy. Since 2010 citizens have awoken to action. This telluric and social process, set off on February 27th 2010, has consistently gained speed since: first thanks to the solidarity and mutual assistance provoked by the disaster, then because the earthquake and tsunami both revealed the inequalities of Chilean society and provided an opportunity for people to get together and organise. We have chosen to call this process the double telluric and social movement.

2. THE POBLADORES MOVEMENTS AND THE SOCIO-NATURAL DISASTERS

The recent period – from 2010 to 2014 – is a point of inflexion in Chilean society (this process is still ongoing) and within the pobladores movement. After the dual telluric and social movements in 2010 (Pulgar, 2010a), in 2011 we witnessed (Pulgar, 2010b) the eruption of a broader social movement that is the most “significant of the past twenty years”, after the resistance movement against dictatorship in the 1980s. This is related, according to our hypothesis, to the structural contradictions of the “model”. It is important to emphasize the spreading over the territory of the social movement, in which the pobladores movement played a decisive role. We will study two social movements: on the one hand because they are different because of their sudden eruption and
novelty; on the other hand because of their interconnection at the national level and their ability to negotiate and make proposals in various fields. We talk about the FENAPO – Federación Nacional de Pobladores (Pobladores national federation) and the MNRJ – Movimiento Nacional para la Reconstrucción Justa (National movement for the just reconstruction): both of them operate as local movement federations.

Both movements, FENAPO and MNRJ, are “movements of movements”, “networks of networks that are building a new historical subject, pluralistic and diverse”. Concerning FENAPO and MNRJ,

“from being strictly protest movements, they became movements proposing solutions, technically supported by NGOs, academics and people who are graduates from different fields. Their demands are also broad. Far from restricting themselves to matters specifically related to their local needs, many movements started to criticize the development model. The fact that they have a network-based organization partly explains the broadening local vision to a more inclusive and universal vision”.

Urban social movements at the same time turn into spaces of non-formal education in civilian society, as suggested by Gohn. The pobladores movements (including homeless people, or “allegados” who are deeply in debt and have suffered damage) gathered in the FENAPO were about to announce their proposals for the housing urban policies in March 2010 when Sebastian Piñera, an entrepreneur supported by a right-wing coalition, became president of the country. Nevertheless, because of the earthquake of February 27, 2010, they appeared few weeks before the change of presidency. Thus, their direct action, organization and growth have been built upon the humanitarian response that they provided to the people who suffered damages, what they called themselves a help “de pueblo a pueblo” (from people to people).
This action shows an organic resilience regarding resource mobilization. The public appearance of FENAPO took place in April 2010 during its first street mobilization, in front of the Presidential Palace when they demanded a meeting with the President of the Republic; then, in June 2010, in another street mobilization “to demand the commitments be fulfilled and to be informed about its position regarding social housing, debt and reconstruction”. After a series of major mobilizations, the movement succeeded in creating a group that worked directly with the minister and his closest advisors at that time, in January 2011. Thanks to the negotiations, the Ministry stopped its plan to liberalize housing policy and the grassroots organizations obtained its commitment to support them in developing self-governed social housing projects. This victory of a resistance strategy highlighted the capabilities of social movement.

Simultaneously, the movements of people affected by the earthquake and tsunami of 2010 joined a wider network called the National Movement for the Just Reconstruction (MNRJ) and this network turned into citizens’ main representative for the defense of those people affected by the earthquake. It enables all of these issues to be made visible at a national level. In the context of the emergence of these new collective actors, the FENAPO is the “heir” of a historical social movement, the Chile pobladores movement. However, the MNRJ appears to be a response to the reconstruction process, a response from the people affected by earthquake who are allied to components of the pobladores historical social movement. These new social movements emerge within the context of a subsidiary and neoliberal State that is contested. Faced with obvious limitations as a result of this type of State, new social demands are emerging in order to obtain more autonomy or self-governance.

Four years later, with the emergence of this “dual telluric and social movement” which induced a change in the government coalition, we observe some continuity in the action of the pobladores
movements. Without going in details about internal discussions, the reorganization of the forces that compose it, the splits of the movement of the people affected by housing debt and other problems, we can notice the FENAPO continued to progress throughout these years on both local and national scale\textsuperscript{10}. Moreover, the MNRJ\textsuperscript{11} has become less important because the 2010 reconstruction (not to mention the neoliberal policies going on) progressed very rapidly, which made a large part of the grassroots activists go back to their territories in order to help further their projects; or they disappeared once their main demands were fulfilled.

3. THE RESPONSE OF THE POBLADORES AFFECTED BY DAMAGES IN IQUIQUE AND VALPARAISO BEFORE THE RECONSTRUCTION

Concerning the earthquake of 2010, the mobilizations for the reconstruction took months of organizing, while in Iquique in 2014, they were initiated few days after. This shows that the pobladores organizations had improved their empowerment and organization, which was due to the change in the country’s “social climate” since 2010. The main difference is that in 2014, no new pobladores movements had been created or consolidated, nor were any federations, in either Valparaiso or Iquique, except for some groups of people who were affected by the earthquake and who became allied to either FENAPO or what remains of the MNRJ.

In Iquique, demonstrations started three days after the earthquake\textsuperscript{12} and they went on until September. During our fieldwork in Iquique and Alto Hospicio, six months after the earthquake, we could observe that the reconstruction process had not yet begun. As the people affected have actively joined forces, the government responded by providing rapid aid for renting during the emergency period, which enabled them to calm people and avoid potential resistances. A large proportion of the victims of the earthquake in
Iquique, as in Alto Hospicio, lived in social housing that had been built over the past thirteen years. We can assume that lots of them preferred to deal with the current approach, a “top down” solution that is the result of many years of alienating subsidiary politics. Indeed, this strategy consisting of providing case-by-case solutions was a trap for collective organization. In Iquique, we managed to develop a public-private alliance with a mining company, which offered 240 emergency houses of good quality. In Alto Hospicio, the context was less praiseworthy, as six months after some families were still sleeping in tents. The lack of mobilization in Iquique as in Alto Hospicio may be due to the vulnerabilities that already existed, in addition to the vote-catching approach. In addition, as the damages were mainly concerned with social housing, reconstruction faced obstacles and mobilizations faced neutralization attempts.

In Valparaiso, the main difference with Iquique-Alto Hospicio is that there is a social fabric and a very significant form a social production of the city, as proved by the “urban phenomenon of the tomas de terrenos in Valparaiso ravines”, in the very area where the huge fire took place. As soon as the emergency phase started, self-governance played an essential role in Valparaiso, which allowed thousands of volunteers to clean the debris and build emergency dwellings. The authorities were overwhelmed by a myriad of volunteers who were moved by the violence of the fire and thousands of them went to help the harbor. The preexisting territorial organizations such as the social and cultural centers, but also inhabitant organizations etc. helped channel the aid. At the beginning, the State relied on grassroots organizations but rapidly decided to forbid volunteering because it would start turning into an authority in parallel to the institutional authority. Contrary to Iquique, the Valparaiso pobladores started to rebuild via their own means only a few days after the fire. Six months later, we could observe on the field the continuous process of self-governed re-
construction. Mention should be made of the initiatives such as conflict mapping\textsuperscript{13} or the collaborative projects, which – not only because of the fire – demonstrated the capabilities of organizations in Valparaiso and their bottom-up way of functioning. This allows them to anticipate long-term resistances.

4. DIGNITY AGAINST RESILIENCES AND THE RESISTANCES TO THE NEOLIBERAL CITY IN CHILE

Dignity is a process that is socially constructed and from our perspective, this construction is enhanced especially when resistance processes rise and become alternatives. We can comprehend this resistance under the Foucauldian perspective of power relations, while stating that “where there is power there is resistance”. From this approach we find the existence of a “disciplinary society”, consisting of a network of devices and applications that produce and regulate both habits and customs as social practices. Today we understand this disciplinary society from the perspective of the hegemonic neoliberal society and the political project behind it, which it imposes globally. We must also understand how resistances are brought out in the context of a concept of power understood as a «network of relationships» rather than an object.

Resistance is nullified or made invisible by those in power, preferring to talk about resilience, especially under the official rhetoric, both from governments as international organizations like the UN. The poor should be “resilient” is constantly repeated, but the poor themselves are repressed and contested when they seem «reluctant» to the austerity policies (or structural adjustment), abuses, lack of democracy, corruption, ultimately to oppression. It is then that collective action processes can be understood as resistances, in different degrees. Resistances to an ideological, political, economic, social and cultural model. Social movements besides often also acting resiliently, while adapting and recovering from various
situations of oppression initiate “practices of resistance” from everyday life. Resistance is not reactive nor negative, but an ongoing process of creation and transformation.

The concept of resilience in many cases neutralizes the potential for conflict, therefor we confront the concepts of resilience and resistance especially from the action of organized social actors: social movements. To understand these dialectical relationships between resilience and resistance in the territory, it is necessary to identify the practices of the actors, especially understanding conflict as an opportunity for transformation, as a process of emancipation.

There is a time when social movements «evolve» and move from protest-welfare logic, and begin to develop practical alternatives to the hegemonic model, always starting from the territories, as a true self-determination of dignity. These processes could be understood as collective alienations, which are often linked to “dignifying” practices rendering the construction of autonomy and self-management processes. There are many worldly examples, especially since 2011: the occupation of squares and streets in protests in Tunis, Cairo, Madrid, Barcelona, New York, Santiago-Chile, Lis-bon; land occupations of the landless in Brazil, of the people in Chile, Dakar; factory recovery and self-management by workers in Argentina, Greece and France; the housing cooperatives in Uru-guay, Canada and Chile; rallies in high schools and universities by their students in Chile, Quebec, Spain, Greece, Portugal, among many others. Central to all these processes is space, territorial or-ganization, therefore we are referring to territorial emancipation. Finally when we speak of dignity we refer to the exercise and the conquest of justice. There will be no dignity without resistances, these resistances build alternatives from the collective alienations and emancipatory processes, from the territories of dignity.
5. THE NEO-LIBERAL CITY IN CHILE

The “neoliberal city” concept is important for our analysis of the construction of vulnerability as well as for understanding the role of social actors and the pobladores movement in particular. Analyzing the processes of synergetic vulnerabilities in a context of socio-natural disasters augmented by neoliberal policies, we will concentrate on the case of Santiago, Chile’s capital, as a model of the neo-liberal city. As we will see below, this “[tr.] process of neoliberalization” was reproduced in other cities and areas of the country, “[tr.] but there are few cases like that of Santiago that show as clearly what happens in a city and to its inhabitants when neoliberal policies are implemented.” (Rodríguez, 2004: 4). We are starting from the idea that “[tr.] neoliberalism is not an ideology of State disengagement but the mobilization of the State in a plan for the generalization of market mechanisms” (VVAA, 2012). Using Brenner and Theodore’s (2002) neoliberal destruction/creation model, Rodríguez (2009) identifies four periods of neoliberal destruction and creation in the city of Santiago:

1. Discipline: The elimination and dismantling of organizations in working class neighbourhoods was carried out during the dictatorship by means of repression, suppression of the traditional political space, and the creation of a general climate of terror. The poblaciones14 organizations disappeared due to the disbanding of political parties, the change in the nature of the State and repression of the poblaciones’ leaders and activists. As for urban administration, municipal governments were infiltrated through the appointment of mayors who were most often members of the military. The institutions in charge of urban matters were reorganized and a new population control function was entrusted to the city governments.

2. The market acts as a (de)regulator with the creation of a real estate market, the elimination of city limits as well as an subsidiary State housing policy.
3. A blend of discipline and the market: land regularization. Unlike other similar processes implemented in Latin America that defined land regularization as the transfer of ownership of land to the occupants, in Santiago, this meant retroceding land to the previous owners. To this end, the families occupying informally occupied land (the tomas de terrenos\textsuperscript{15} and campamentos\textsuperscript{16}) were moved to partially subsidized community housing on the city’s periphery (or they had to create new campamentos on the periphery). Thus, this land regularization was much more than a solution to special cases. It was one of the foundations for the restructuring of the urban real estate market. This was called the “sale of the poor” phenomenon entailing the forced removal of more than 150,000 pobladores to the periphery of Santiago (SUR, 1984).

4. The reorganized city (at the administrative level): The previous administrative and territorial structure of the municipalities disappeared. Santiago, which had been divided into 14 administrative districts, was broken into 32 territorial units. The former municipal territories were modified and their boundaries redrawn. They were subdivided for the purpose of achieving socio-economic homogeneity allowing the administration to function better as well as political control of the inhabitants. The management of public services such as education and healthcare was partially transferred to the municipalities as one phase in a process culminating in the privatization of these government services. New labour legislation was enacted, reducing workers’ ability to negotiate. Privatization of social security then made possible the creation of large investment funds – the AFPs (Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones), pension fund administrative bodies – which today have a major role in the urban real estate market and the expansion of the city. These funds are the driving force of real estate development to the extent that they expand the long-term capital market, making it possible for households without capacity for indebtedness to finance the purchase of housing.
6. NEOLIBERAL URBAN POLICY IN CHILE: SEGMENTATION AND URBAN INEQUALITIES

“[tr.] Urban policies depend on specific situations. At given times, they also have overall characteristics that cannot be boiled down to a single society. The policies correspond to the contingent interpretation of transformation models, in situations and periods. Each development model has a corresponding urban model, and each development policy has a corresponding urban policy” (Massiah, 2012: 11).

The intensity of the realization of neoliberal reforms in Chile is to be blamed on the iron hand of a ferocious dictatorship. Sabatini (2000) analyzed how the reform of real estate markets in Santiago had significant effects on the price of land and on residential segregation. This liberalization policy was based on three key principles: urban real estate is not a limited resource; the market is best placed to assign various uses to the land; land use must be governed by flexible provisions that are determined on the basis of market requirements.

Evident in official MINVU documents between 1978 and 1981, the liberalization of city land brought about by the 1979 elimination of “city limits”, sought to use the market to lower land prices by increasing the supply - according to the official narrative. But the effect was the opposite, since prices went up. Land speculation, which an overnight administrative decision included within the city limits, was crucial in the evolution of the prices. Social housing was gradually distanced from more central locations toward areas outside the city due to the phenomenon of speculation that still exists today.

7. HOUSING POLICY IN NEOLIBERAL CHILE

According to the argument put forward by Gilbert (2003), Chile’s
housing policy was not imposed through the Washington consensus. To the contrary, the radical neoliberal Chilean technocrats – the “Chicago Boys” – went beyond Washington’s policies to make Chile the model that was copied and disseminated by international organizations. Gilbert explains that after the coup, “[t.r.] the military government immediately got rid of the socialist housing program, even if it didn’t replace it with anything. However, in 1975, a new housing model was beginning to take shape. The new system would be guided by the market and would be integrated into much more competitive economic and financial systems. On the supply side, public housing would no longer be sponsored by the state but built by the private sector based on signals sent by the market. Rather than the developers building based on orders from the public sector, they would be competing to produce what consumers want-ed. The State would therefore be reduced to a “subsidiary” role (Gilbert, 2003: 138).

The subsidized housing system, which is still topical, represented a major change because it directed the demand of those in need to the market. In addition to the necessary indebtedness of the beneficiaries, this system introduced the idea of targeting according to which “[t.r.] housing would be a good that could not be obtained except through individual effort; the State subsidy would be reserved for the neediest in the guise of compensation for their efforts” (Chilean chamber of construction, 1991: 90-91). Rodriguez and Sugranyes (2005) affirm that subsidized housing in Chile does not constitute a housing policy per se, but “first and foremost a financial mechanism supporting the private real estate and construction sector”. Undergoing full structural adjustment during the 1980s, the Chilean government’s top priority was to stabilize the private construction sector. The strategy for doing this was the privatization of the entire housing production system. The Chilean Chamber of Construction, an employers’ association that brings together the largest construction companies, played (and
continues to play) an essential role in determining and implementing this policy.

The massive construction of housing for the poor – although of poor quality and located in the periphery – managed to quiet social demands for many years. Sugranyes (2012) asserts that between 1990 and 1997, the MINVU managed to “[tr.] build as many homes as Germany after World War II, achieving an absolutely outstanding annual rate of ten units per 1,000 inhabitants. This record level was maintained for a number of years, providing home ownership to most applicants from the poorest sectors”.

In the last 30 years in Chile, public policies on subsidies have succeeded in converting the poor – considered marginal, vulnerable and excluded – into simple, assisted beneficiaries (and not actors) of social programs, and target-objects (and not subjects) of public policy. However, the housing policy generated a crisis by creating ghettos of urban poverty, areas of “non-homeless” pobladores (Rodríguez, 2005): “[tr.] The world of marginality is in fact built by the State in a process of social integration and political mobilization, in exchange for goods and services that it alone has the power to give” (Castells, 1986).

This housing policy reflects the concept of alienation, understood as the result of public policies and as a situation “[tr.] imposed on all facets of the individual’s daily life by institutions and organizations that do not allow participation in the providing of services” (Ruipérez, 2006).

8. THE RECONSTRUCTION POLICY: SAME RECIPE?

Various reports (MNRJ, 2011a; Rolnik, 2011; INDH, 2012; UN Mission-HABITAT, 2010) by human rights organizations after the earthquake have shown “[tr.] the reconstruction ideology”, a topic that has also been addressed in certain articles and even in special interest stories in the press. In “[tr.] The ideological failure of
reconstruction”, Perez (2011) suggests that this model (of reconstruction) is shown to be an approach that the State dismantles, transferring its powers to private actors, deemed to be “[tr.] brilliant, powerful and prominent”. In the reconstruction process, emphasis was placed on the allocation of subsidies, simplification of the bureaucracy and private sector facilitation, while the victims were to be assigned housing of mediocre quality, were segregated, far from their daily and social lives, and designed as an emergency solution.

These various components underscore the importance of the role played by social movements in general in Chile today, particularly by the pobladores movement, in resistance to a hegemonic development model.

2- Social movements and the struggle for the city, between power and action

It is our theory that the earthquake served to detonate urban social movements that were rebuilding in an advanced neoliberal setting. We will examine the mobilization and resistance process by considering the spatial aspect of the collective action and by taking the example of the two pobladores movements at the national level. This process can be understood as an illustration of “[tr.] social movement resistance and the emergence of counter-models and debates on the just post-neoliberal city” to echo the call for contributions for this issue.

9. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Reconstruction processes, and therefore the production of Chilean cities, must be understood as a conflict. A conflict between on the one side agents who take the money and who take advantage of the transfer of public wealth to the private sector through the real estate market and subsidies; and on the other side the majority, who resist this logic and who defend use value against market exchange
value. Social movements propose to move forward towards spatial justice in order to go beyond the subsidiary model of housing and therefore reconstruction, in order to build cities with a social function of the land and self-governance, and to stand up against the current market supremacy. It is clear, therefore, that through pragmatic initiatives, we can actually build post-neoliberal cities.

However, we ought to set the emergence of these urban social movements in a broader historical context and understand that the current movements are a part of the historical pobladores movements in Chile. Our assumption of the dual telluric and social movement is based on this: the earthquake was actually a catalyst or mobilizing call for processes that were in action but underground. The proposals and projects, in particular FENAPO’s, wanted more autonomy based on self-governance and questioned the welfare-based dependency relationship to the State which was increased by neoliberal policies. This conflict demonstrates the dialectics between alienation due to neoliberal policies and the emancipatory processes that started to emerge within the territories. The resistance and resilience processes entwine and this increases the dialectical complexity of the issue.

In some previous work we studied one of the movements that founded FENAPO: the MPL 18. We want to draw attention to it because of its knowledge of how to vary its action modes, from urban housing to education, proving its resistance and resilience capabilities during a struggle. The definition of the MPL is to manage “struggles without the State, through territory control and self-governance, against the State, through direct action in order to crumble the leading order; and from the State, as a build-up of anti-system forces”. The MPL proposes a complex and autonomous strategy capable of being on several fronts at the same time in order to go beyond welfare-based demands. It is interesting to notice how this proposal is consistent with the analysis of Lopes de Souza on the autonomy of other Latin American social move-
ments, which grow “together with the State, in spite of the State, against the State”. Especially, indeed, in the case of the Movement of the Workers without a roof in Brazil, or the piquetero movement in Argentina.

So, how do we combine the concepts of right to the city and spatial justice with the action of the urban social movements in Chile? Soja explains the difference between both concepts as follows: spatial justice is an analytical approximation that can “be operational” in various ways locally, whereas, the right to the city can be understood as a common global and political horizon, which combines several demands. We note that the neoliberal agenda is still in force: while the MINVU is discussing the new urban development policy, simultaneously, the pobladores movement is fortifying its vision, which, as we have seen, evolved from claiming a right to housing towards a broader horizon, based on right to the city to produced the emergence of a post-neo-liberal just city based in autonomy and emancipatory practices.

NOTES

1. The earthquake caused 521 casualties and 56 missing people. According to the figures published on March 29th 2010 by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning (MINVU), 370,051 homes were damaged by the earthquake, of which 81,440 were destroyed and 108,914 severely damaged. Numerous equipments were damaged as well. An uncommon tsunami occurred after the earthquake, reaching the shore at different times with varying levels of intensity, thus worsening the damage caused by the earthquake.

2. Poblador(es): Inhabitants of a población [city]. In Latin America and especially in Chile, this term has a social, and often political, connotation that the work “inhabitant” doesn’t. Pobladores refers to communities living in working-class neighbourhoods fighting for a space, to have their own neighbourhood, their own street, and their right to the city. The iden-
tity of the poblador is closely tied to the history of the production of space.


4. From 1990-2010, four governments were democratically elected, from centre-left parties in a block called “Concertación de partidos por la democracia”, [joint action of parties for democracy].

5. Based on what we were able to observe, there were many more demonstrations of direct solidarity and especially mutual assistance than looting or other antisocial behaviour which although lesser, was nonetheless played up by the media

6. Allegados : a word for the people who, because they don’t have housing, are obliged to live in their families’ or rent a room in a house

7. Ayuda de pueblo a pueblo : assistance provided directly by grassroots organizations to the victims of the earthquake and tsunami, with no intermediary (government or NGO)

8. «700 pobladores de la FENAPO se movilizaron en Santiago» [700 pobladores from FENAPO rallied in Santiago], El Ciudadano, 4 junio 2010.

9. This work was supported by Chile University with the « Consultorio de Arquitectura FAU » [Consulting agency of the Faculty of Architecture and Town planning of Chile, architecture, housing, community and participation]

10. In 2014, the FENAPO experienced another year of strong mobilization. The major one concerned the occupation of Mapocho riverbanks in the very center of Santiago, during 74 days in the middle of winter. After this brilliant action, which the media completely eclipsed whereas more than 4000 people had gone there to support the occupation on August 19, FENAPO decided to occupy a building in the center of the capital, in Bellas Artes district, a gentrified and very touristic area. Families were living in this building, they were demanding to exercise their right to the city and the pledges of subsidies for housing finally fulfilled. After occupying the building during three months, the police violently evicted the families on December 3, 2014.

11. Even though one of the spokesperson takes part, as a representative of civil society, at CNDU [Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano = Na-
tional Council for Urban Development], grassroots are not mobilized any-
more, nor organized.
12. “Habitantes de Iquique encienden barricadas para protestar por falta
de ayuda” [City dwellers of Iquique set fire to barricade in order to protest
against the lack of assistance], EMOL, April 4 2014.
13. “¿Te invité yo a vivir aquí? Cartografía colectiva crítica de Valparaí-
so”, [Did I tell you to come and live here? Collective critical cartography],
Iconoclasistas, July 2014.
14. Poblaciones: Term used in Chile to designate neighbourhoods created
by the occupation of land, mainly in the 1950s and 60s, or land that has
been precariously developed. Most poblaciones development is done by
its inhabitants, the pobladores, and by public policy intervention (Pulgar,
2011).
15. “Tomas de terreno”: illegal occupation of land to build houses for
oneself or to exert political pressure to obtain housing
16. Organized shantytown arising from the illegal occupation of land
(toma de terreno) by a homeless group organized into a “sin casa” (home-
less) committee.
17. Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo. Ministry of Housing and Urban
Planning.
18. Movimiento de Pobladores en Lucha, Movement of Inhabitants in
Struggle

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